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Abstract. Cloud Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) is vulnerable to mal-
ware due to its exposure to external adversaries, making it a lucrative
attack vector for malicious actors. A datacenter infected with malware
can cause data loss and/or major disruptions to service for its users. This
paper analyzes and compares various Convolutional Neural Networks
(CNNs) for online detection of malware in cloud IaaS. The detection is
performed based on behavioural data using process level performance
metrics including cpu usage, memory usage, disk usage etc. We have
used the state of the art DenseNets and ResNets in effectively detecting
malware in online cloud system. CNN are designed to extract features
from data gathered from a live malware running on a real cloud environ-
ment. Experiments are performed on OpenStack (a cloud IaaS software)
testbed designed to replicate a typical 3-tier web architecture. Compara-
tive analysis is performed for different metrics for different CNN models
used in this research.
Keywords: Deep Learning, Convolutional Neural Network, Cloud IaaS,
Residual Networks, Dense Networks
1 Introduction and Motivation
Cloud has become a popular platform due to its characteristics of on-demand
services, infinite resources, ubiquitous availability and pay-as-you go business
model [1]. Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) is the most widely offered service
model where the resources of a large data center can be purchased by clients to
perform computing tasks. Since user clients can utilize any number of virtual
machines, ranging from a couple to thousands, automatic monitoring of these
virtual machines is necessary to ensure the security of the cloud provider and
its clients. While there are several risks associated with IaaS, one of the great-
est risks is the possibility of a virtual machine becoming infected with malware
and spreading the malware to other virtual machines in the data center. This
would put cloud providers and their customers in danger as well as end users
whose data is stored or transferred on these infected virtual machines. As cloud
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providers increase their client base, the potential for loss also increases and so
does the responsibility of cloud providers to invest in security mechanisms for
their customers. The scale of an attack is multiplied due to similar configuration
and automatic provisioning of the virtual machines (VMs) hosted by a cloud ser-
vice provider. Identical configurations for these virtual machines make attacks
repeatable and allow them to more likely spread within the data center once a
single machine is infected.
Static malware analysis technique is widely used, in which the files are
scanned before they can be executed on the systems. In such case, file is dis-
assembled by a disasssemblers to obtain the source code which can then be
examined using different tools. Although the method is fast and efficient, but it
can be easily dodged by malware writers who can trick the disassemblers into
generating incorrect code. This is done by inserting errors which lead to the
actual code execution path being hidden or obfuscated. The binary file can also
be worked on directly. An example of this is extracting n-grams of the binary
file as features and then using machine learning techniques to locate known ma-
licious patterns. Static analysis generally fails in the case of cloud malware as
malware is injected into an application that was already scanned and deemed
safe. Such an attack in cloud IaaS is referred to as a cloud malware injection [2].
In this case, if the application is not re-scanned at a later time, the newly inject
malware will not be detected. Therefore, the need to constantly monitor these
applications running in cloud environments is essential.
While there are several works in the domain of malware detection, few re-
search papers [3–9] deal with online malware detection specifically and in par-
ticular provide solutions using machine learning based approach. This process
consists of a typical machine learning approach i.e. building a machine learning
model, training the model with relevant dataset captured, and using the trained
model to determine if a malware exists in the system or not. In the case of build-
ing the model, features must first be selected to determine what data will be used
as input. This is no different for cloud based detection methods except that the
features to be chosen are limited to the information that can be gained through
the hypervisor. Through careful selection of features, machine learning can be
used to provide dynamic malware analysis and detect in case machines have been
infected by adversaries in the data centers. This kind of dynamic analysis fulfills
the need for constant surveillance in cloud IaaS for malware detection.
The most unique characteristics of cloud computing include resource pool-
ing, on-demand self-service, and rapid elasticity which can be fulfilled by an
auto-scaling architecture. In this paper, we focus on auto-scaling wherein the
machines are spawned based on the demand and usually these VMs are of simi-
lar type, resulting in similar behaviour. It is likely that that an injected malware
will result in behaviour deviation on a VM at some point. In this work, we seek
to detect such malicious behaviour and compare state-of-the-art deep learning
models on several parameters. We are focused on detecting only one VMs which
have been compromised ignoring that the fact that all similar VMs can be in-
fected by an adversary in a more sophisticated attack. We plan to work on this
as a next step to this problem.
This work is an extension to our earlier work where only one kind of CNN
model was used, with the prime goal that such techniques can be effectively used
malware analysis. In this work, we compare and contrast several CNN models
using the same data as [3–5] and six other deep learning models to determine
possible use cases within a cloud IaaS scenario. For all models, the dataset con-
sists of process-level metrics collected from the virtual machine hypervisor. Since
these models are CNNs, the data is formatted as two dimensional matrices with
the dimensions being unique processes × selected features. Since many of our
models require the input to be 3 dimensional shape, the 2d matrix is copied to
fulfill the third dimension requirement.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses related work in cloud
online malware detection. Section 3 provide an overview of the key intuition
and methodology for the experiments. Section 4 covers evaluation metrics and
experimental results whereas Section 5 presents comparative analysis among
different CNN models used. Section 6 covers certain limitations of our approach
along with discussion on future work. Finally, section 7 summarizes this paper.
2 Related Work
Several works have been done in malware detection which focus on different
aspects of several approaches. The first step in developing a machine learning
based model for online malware detection is to determine which features are
most relevant and are to be extracted. Research papers [10–12] focus on API
calls whereas [7,13,14] primarily utilize system calls. Other features such as per-
formance counters [15] or memory features [16,17] have also been used. Although
several existing resilience frameworks exist [9, 18–20], it is likely that novel at-
tacks and new techniques will defeat existing detection methods.
Most of the algorithms for detecting malware, such as support vector ma-
chines (SVM) [9], all-nearest-neighbor (ANN) classifier [21], and na¨ıve bayes
[10, 22], work for examining a single VM in the cloud. While a running single
vm is not the expected use case of cloud environments, there is virtually no dif-
ference between a single VM and a standalone host when it comes to detecting
malware on them. Generally, most works [7, 10–17] focus on features that can
be extracted through the hypervisor. Dawson et al [7] collect system calls for
features and are primarily concerned with rootkits. A non linear phase-space al-
gorithm is used in their analysis of system calls to detect anomalies. The results
are evaluated on the phase-space graph dissimilarities.
Entropy based Anomaly Testing (EbAT) was introduced in [8]. EbAT ana-
lyzed multiple metrics such as CPU and memory utilization for the purposes of
anomaly detection. The paper analyzed these metrics based upon distribution
instead of a flat threshold. This approach yielded accurate results for detection
and the ability to scale to keep up with metric processing. However, the evalua-
tion did not demonstrate usefulness in practical and realistic cloud environment
scenarios. Azmandian et al. [23] utilize performance metrics such as disk and
network input-output gathered from the hypervisor to form a new anomaly de-
tection approach. K-NN and Local Outlier Factor are unsupervised machine
learning techniques used in this work.
Work by Abdelsalam et al [4] showed that a black box approach can be used to
detect malware. This paper used VM-level performance and resource utilization
metrics. This approach worked well in detecting highly active malware which
showed up in the resource utilization metrics, but was not as effective in detecting
malware that hid itself with low utilization. Similarly, in [3] the authors introduce
a detection method which uses a CNN model with the goal of identifying low
profile malware. This method achieved 90% accuracy using resource metrics and
was able to identify multiple low-profile malware. While these results are good,
it is limited in that it targeted only a single virtual machine like many other
related works without features like auto-scaling.
3 Key Intuition and Methodology
In this section, we discuss the key intuition behind our approach and describe
our methodology in detail.
3.1 Key Intuition
So as to detect online malware using process-level information, we train a model
on a dataset that contains benign and malicious samples. Each sample consists
of information about a process or collection of processes, and the task is to
classify the input sample as benign or malicious. To build up our dataset of
benign samples, we run a Virtual Machine (VM) normally without the presence
of malicious software. Malicious data samples are collected after the VM has
been infected with malware.
Different malware are used for different runs of the experiment to create
the dataset. We then partition our dataset into into training, validation, and
testing datasets. In other words, the model is trained on samples from different
experiments which contained different malware. This way, the model generalizes
itself to detect different malware through the various ways they reveal themselves
in process metrics. A model’s ability to generalize and predict new samples is
dependent on its internal architecture. More complex models may achieve higher
accuracy by adding more hidden layers or by connecting those hidden layers in
a novel manner.
3.2 Methodology
Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN) have been commonly used in various
visual imagery tasks. A basic flowchart of a neural network is shown in Figure 1.
CNNs generally take two dimensional data as an input, in our case, the process
level data is represented as a two dimensional array. A sample consists of rows
Fig. 1: Neural Network Flow
Fig. 2: Sample at Time t Consisting of
Process Level Information
of processes with columns of process features. Assuming pi is a process, fn is a
process metric, vm is a virtual machine ID, then Xvmt is a sample at time t as
shown in Figure 2.
Each sample represents a single virtual machine at a given time interval so
the models learn what an infected machine “looks like” over time. During the
course of time in an operating system, processes get created and destroyed and
as these IDs can be assigned/re-assigned to different processes, they provide no
useful information for the task at hand. For this reason, we focus on unique
process defined as a tuple that contains a process ID, the command used to run
the process, and a hash of the binary executable. This unique process will be
referred to as a process in this work. Once the training dataset has been used to
train the model, it is used for generating predictions on an unseen test data set
that the model did not use during the training process.
We used Openstack4, a popular cloud computing platform to replicate a
standard 3-tier web architecture consisting of a web server, application server,
and a database. Auto-scaling was enabled on the web server and the application
servers were configured with a policy based on the average CPU utilization of
the VMs. As per the policy, if the average CPU utilization is above 70%, the
architecture scales out and it scales in if the utilization is below 30%. We spawned
between 2 and 10 servers in each tier depending on the traffic load. An ON/OFF
Pareto distribution with the default NS25 tool parameters was used to generate
the traffic load.
Figure 3, shows the data collection process. Each experiment was 1 hour long,
consisting of a 30 minute clean phase and a 30 minute infected phase. During the
clean phase, the virtual machines were untouched. During the infected phase,
malware was injected into a virtual machine at some time after the infected
phase started. We introduced 113 different malwares to collect our dataset. These
malwares were obtained from VirusTotal6. The VMs were configured with full
internet access and all firewalls were disabled. This was done so that the malware
could operate without any interference. After every 10 seconds, a sample was
4 Openstack. https://www.openstack.org/
5 NS2 Manual. http://www.isi.edu/nsnam/ns/doc/node509.html.
6 VirusTotal Website. https://www.virustotal.com.
Fig. 3: Data Collection Overview
Fig. 4: LeNet-5 Model
collected from the infected virtual machine in the experiment resulting in 360
samples over the course of each experiment.
3.3 Convolutional Neural Network Models
LeNet-5 [24]: It is an example of a shallow CNN. It has few layers so the
gradients can be computed quickly. Figure 4, shows the model architecture.
Note that the architecture is simple and straightforward where the output of
each layer serves as the input to the next layer.
The input to the model, would be a 2 dimensional matrix of 120x45 rep-
resenting a sample with a maximum of 120 processes and 45 features of these
processes. Each process that was not active at the time the sample was taken,
but would become active during the course of the experiment was padded with
zeroes. The first layer of LeNet-5 consists of a convolutional layer with 32 ker-
nels, each with a size of 5x5. The output of this layer is 32 feature maps with the
same input shape of 120x45. The max pooling layer of size 2x2 downsizes these
feature maps to become 60x23. The second convolutional layer has 64 kernels
with the shape of the output from the previous max pooling layer, 60x23. This
convolutional layer is followed by another max pooling layer of size 2x2 which
results in 64 feature maps of size 30x12. The final layers of LeNet-5 are fully
connected with sizes 1024, 512, and 2 respectively. The final layer has an output
of size 2 since it represents a binary prediction of malicious or benign sample.
All of the activation functions used Rectified Linear Units (ReLU) [25] which
were placed after every convolution and fully connected layer excluding the final
layer. We used the Adam Optimizer [26], which is a stochastic gradient de-
scent algorithm with automatic learning rate adaptation. This optimizer trains
Fig. 5: Residual Block Diagram
Fig. 6: Data Input Shape with Window
Size 3
Fig. 7: Dense Networks
the weights of the model after every min-batch. The learning rate controls how
drastically the weights of the model are changed in response to the backpropa-
gation. A higher learning rate leads to faster training but can result in unstable
gradient descent and can inhibit convergence. A learning rate that is too slow
can cause the model not to achieve higher accuracy results.
Residual Networks: One problem with models with a large number of layers is
degradation [27]. This is observation that adding more layers to the network can
lead to optimization problems and therefore lower accuracy. This degradation is
caused by the backpropagation not being able to reach the initial layers of the
model. Residual networks (ResNets) solve this issue by adding skip-connections
or residual connections. By adding these shortcut paths between layers, the
gradient is allowed to flow better through the model and deeper models are able
to be trained without degradation.
Residual blocks as shown in Figure 5, are used in ResNets [27]. The identity is
the shortcut connection and it is what allows the back propagation to affect the
initial layers and allow them to learn as quickly as the final layers in the model.
Three ResNets were used in our work: ResNet-50, ResNet-101, and ResNet-121.
Each ResNet required the window size of the data to be three, but the samples
were all 2d matrices. All samples had their data replicated twice more to form
3 dimensional data. A representation of this data is shown in Figure 6. At the
end of each model, global average pooling was added.
Dense Networks: Where ResNets seek to resolve the gradient degradation
problem, DenseNets [28] attempt to alleviate the vanishing gradient problem [29].
A generic DenseNet model is shown in Figure 7. DenseNets are different from
ResNets because instead of having an identity mapping from one layer to the
next, DenseNets pass the outputs of each layer to all subsequent layers. This way,
each layer has collective knowledge from all the preceding layers. This causes the
feature maps to be ‘reused’ by latter layers. Due to this reuse of feature maps, less
feature maps are required as input due to the compounding nature of DenseNets.
Each dense block makes use of these identity mappings and feature reuse.
Between each dense block, there are transition layers that are comprised of a
convolution and pooling layer. These are meant to reduce the feature map size
between dense blocks. Similar to the ResNets, all DenseNets models received the
same input shape as the ResNet models, 120 × 45 × 3. The batch size used was
64 for all models to maintain consistency.
4 Experimental Evaluation and Results
4.1 Evaluation
For our comparative analysis, we have used four evaluation metrics:
Accuracy =
TP + TN
TP + TN + FP + FN
Precision =
TP
TP + FP
Recall =
TP
TP + FN
F1 Score = 2× Precision×Recall
Precision+Recall
True Positives (TP ) is the number of correctly identified malicious samples. True
Negatives (TN) is the number of correctly identified benign samples. False Posi-
tives (FP ) is the number of samples that were benign but identified as malicious.
False Negatives (FN) are the samples that were malicious but not identified cor-
rectly by the model.
Accuracy is a measure of correct classification. Precision is a measure of accu-
rate positive predictions over the total amount of positive predictions. Precision
is important because if the precision is low, then the model is predicting many
benign samples to be infected. In the case of cloud data centers, this can hurt
the availability of many services if their samples are being incorrectly classified
as malign. Recall is a measure of true positive over total actual positive. This
metric is important because it reveals how often infected samples get through
the model without detection. Recall is useful when the cost of a false negative is
high, such is the case with identifying malware. The F1 score is used whenever
there needs to be a balance between Precision and Recall and there is a large
imbalance in the dataset.
Table 1: Results for Different Evaluation Metrics
Model Accuracy Precision Recall F1 Detection Time (ms)
LeNet-5 89.2 94.7 80.9 87.2 54
ResNet-50 88.4 86.0 88.9 87.4 96
ResNet-101 86.6 82.3 89.7 85.9 130
ResNet-152 89.5 89.0 87.8 88.4 165
DenseNet-121 92.9 100 84.6 91.5 164
DenseNet-169 92.8 99.7 84.4 91.4 209
DenseNet-201 92.8 99.5 84.6 91.5 249
4.2 Experiment Results
Table 1 shows the results of each the CNN models considered in this research.
While each model was tested over the course of 100 epochs, these numbers were
taken from the model when it scored the highest on the validation data set. This
means that these are the best case scenario for each model. If these models were
deployed in a cloud environment, they would be trained up to the point at which
they generate the best results. This point could be different for every model so
it is important to pick out the best performing models and not compare models
based on something arbitrary such as after n epochs.
The dataset used consisted of 113 data collection experiments which were
split up into the following: training dataset (60%), validation data (20%), and
testing data (20%). The training dataset was shuffled but the validation and
testing dataset were not. DenseNets reached the highest accuracy at almost 93%
and precision at 100%. DenseNets also had the highest F1 scores at 91.5%.
ResNet-101 had the best recall score at 89.7%.
5 Comparative Analysis and Discussion
As stated in section 4.1, the comparative analysis is performed using four metrics.
We discuss each of the metrics along with the ROC curves. Additionally, we
discuss the detection time of the models. Finally, we provide an overall analysis
discussion and take away which sheds the light on the importance of finding the
balance in choosing right models based on the use case and intention. Results
for all performance metrics are show in Figure 8.
5.1 Performance Analysis
Accuracy. The base model LeNet-5 reaches an accuracy of 89%. This is ex-
pected as it is a shallow model, thus it lacks the ability to capture enough
features. The DenseNet-121 model has the highest accuracy of 93%, with a
very negligible difference compared to DenseNet-169 and DenseNet-201. This
Fig. 8: Metrics Comparison for used CNN Models
indicates that the adding more layers did not increase the accuracy. One reason
might lie in the fact that our dataset is limited (i.e., 40k samples) and deeper
networks need more data.
ResNet-152 has a slightly better accuracy than LeNet-5. Considering the
substantially longer training time for ResNet-152, such slight accuracy increase
from LeNet-5 might not be worthwhile in some cases. Note that ResNet might
perform better considering other metrics and, in turn, might work in different
scenarios. ResNet-50 and ResNet-101 have the lowest accuracy.
The DenseNets performed better than the other models likely due to the
feature reuse property of the dense blocks. Also, DenseNet models are more
feature efficient than the other models.
Precision. The DenseNet models highly outperformed the other models in
precision. DenseNet-121 achieved a precision of 100%, meaning that every sample
classified as infected was indeed infected. DenseNet-169 also achieved a high
precision of 99.7% followed by DenseNet-201 with a precision of 99.5%.
The ResNet models have noticeable lower precision than all the other mod-
els, indicating that they are incorrectly classifying benign samples as malicious.
LeNet-5 achieved a high precision score so it would be more appealing than the
ResNet models when some false positives can be tolerated. The high precision
achieved by all the DenseNet models indicates that they correctly identified the
benign samples more often and were less likely to classify samples as malicious
unless they had a high confidence.
Fig. 9: ROC Curves
Recall. Recall is the only metric where ResNets performed better than the
other models. All three ResNet models were close but ResNet-101 was the best.
The DenseNet models performed worse than the ResNet models but LeNet-5
performed the worst by far. Since recall is a measure of many infected samples
where missed by the models, ResNets seem to be effective at identifying most
infected samples. LeNet-5’s low recall score suggests that the model is weak at
identifying less obvious malicious samples. This would be a large problem in
datacenters where the samples taken should represent an unbalanced dataset.
There should be an overwhelming amount of benign samples before machines are
infected and malicious samples begin to show up and a low recall scoring model
would be less reliable in predicting the malware as soon as it appears. The higher
recall scores demonstrated by the ResNet models are caused by the model being
more sensitive and classifying more samples as malicious. This means that the
model predicted a sample was malicious more often and was better at identifying
those malware who were not as ”obvious” in the performance metrics.
F1 Score. F1 Score is about the balance of precision and recall. In that
regard, the DenseNet models scored the highest, which indicates that they have
the best balance between identifying only malicious samples and identifying most
of infected samples overall.
ROC Curves. The receiver operating characteristic (ROC) analysis [30] is
used for comparing models at different thresholds. Our ROC curves are shown
in Figure 9. The ROC characteristic measures a models ability to distinguish
between classes so in our experiments, it measures the models’ abilities to detect
malware. If the ROC curve for a model is close to representing a f(x) = x
line, then the model has little ability to differentiate between classes. A common
way to analyze the ROC curve is to measure the area-under-curve (AUC) value.
When the AUC is higher, then the model is accurately predicting benign samples
Fig. 10: Highest Validation Accuracies Achieved
as benign and malicious samples as malicious. The best performing models were
the DenseNet models due to their high precision scores which involve both TP
and FP values.
5.2 Cost Analysis
Training Time. Table 2 shows the training time needed to reach the respective
accuracies for the models. LeNet-5 trained ten times faster than the next fastest
model making it viable as a model to quickly process large volumes of data.
DenseNet-201 and DenseNet-169 took much longer to train than DenseNet-121
while reaching similar accuracy making them less desirable.
Detection Time. Detection time is used to show how long in milliseconds
each model took to produce a prediction for any given sample. The results are
unsurprising, more layers in a model cause it to take longer to feed the input
through the model. This is important to include, however, because samples in
a data center may be getting collected faster than a given model process a
prediction. The detection time differences may also indicate that some models
may not be suited for lower specification hardware. Since the detection time is
dependent on how quickly the model can process the input, increasing the input
size or the volume of inputs could prevent some models from scaling with large
data center operations. In these cases, the models with lower detection times
may be preferable.
Table 2: Time to Reach Highest Accuracy
Model Validation Accuracy Epoch Reached Time Elapsed (s)
LeNet-5 89.9 29 170
ResNet-50 90.7 67 1815
ResNet-101 87.0 60 2940
ResNet-152 88.7 99 7029
DenseNet-121 92.1 32 1683
DenseNet-169 91.9 81 5848
DenseNet-201 91.5 36 3060
5.3 Overall Analysis
Overall, the DenseNet models were the most accurate models with the best
balance between precision and recall. The low scores in recall though might
be an issue for our use case where allowing malicious samples to slip through
could be disastrous. It is also worth noting that while most of the models had
validation accuracies that converged to a value, ResNet-101 and ResNet-152 had
large fluctuations and never seemed to settle in to a value. This can be seen in
Figure 11. If ResNet-101 and ResNet-152 converged to some values, then they
may have had better scores. With the inclusion of detection time, assuming the
volume of input does not overwhelm the model predicting capabilities, then the
DenseNet models would be preferable due to their high accuracy and near perfect
precision.
Figure 10 and Table 2 show the points in the training where the models
reached their highest validation accuracy. The time elapsed column shows the
total time needed to reach the epoch where those highest accuracy numbers
were achieved. For examples, DenseNet-121 reached its highest accuracy after
32 training epochs and it took 1683 seconds. This shows that DenseNet-121 could
be trained for less time than DenseNet-169 or DenseNet-201 and attain better
accuracy.
6 Limitations and Challenges
Although, our results provide good understanding of which CNN model works
best in what kind of scenario, there are some limitations we would like to high-
light based on our experience. The most important limitation of using CNN on
the type of data we used is that it fails to capture a time correlation in the
data set. When detecting malware in an already running virtual machine, it is
important for a model to have some knowledge about existing samples and the
behavior of the machine over time. One such scenario is when a machine begins
to experience more traffic and due to some constraint on scaling, the samples
Fig. 11: Training and Validation Loss for used CNN Models
generated from that machine begin to resemble some malicious samples. In this
case, if the model does not learn that process metrics can be scaled according
to valid demands on the machine, the false positive rate might increase. An-
other scenario is when the model detects an infected sample, but the malware
immediately becomes dormant as to hide itself. If the model does not take into
account the previous sample when the malware was detected, it may increase
false negatives where the model doesn’t detect a malware even if it is hidden.
These limitations can be mitigated by using Recurrent Neural Networks
(RNN). RNN’s are comprised of cells which have a memory mechanism and
can learn relationships among data with respect to time. These RNN models are
used to process sequences of data such as audio or text. Our brief introduction to
RNN models suggest that they can be used to solve some of the issues discussed
above by lowering false positives and false negatives in certain scenarios.
Another limitation of this paper is the number of malware samples used. We
used roughly 120 malware samples, however, we believe with more samples CNN
models could have performed better. The deeper networks such as DenseNet-201
and ResNet-152 may perform better on malware that affect the system very little,
and the complexity of those networks may be trained on those samples better
than a shallower model. By increasing the amount of malware available, the
models also gain a broader data set that could be used to better generalize their
predictive power. Also once malware is injected, there are no guarantees that
the malware is exhibiting malicious behavior at any given time without knowing
what code was being executed at that same moment the sample was recorded.
This can lead to a problem where samples are mislabeled as malicious or benign.
This problem was addressed in [3], but without writing custom malware that will
beacon when malicious activity begins and ends, it is unlikely that all samples
will be labeled properly.
7 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we analyzed seven different convolutional neural network models
to determine which one is better suited for malware detection in cloud IaaS. Our
analysis shows that LeNet-5 model is quick but sacrifices accuracy. The model
is still useful as it attains a 90% accuracy and can be used in situations where
a quick prediction is needed but incorrectness is not too costly. It can also be
used when early predictions can be made with LeNet-5 which can be rechecked
with more complex models. Also, our analysis suggest that while the residual
networks performed well averaging 86 accuracy, the DenseNet models performed
the best at 93% accuracy. The ResNet models have higher recall scores indicating
that they are more suited for cases where not identifying the malware posing a
great security risk. DenseNet models have higher accuracy and precision which
indicates they are less likely to generate false positives which are useful in IaaS
environments where service availability is extremely important. For future work,
we plan to examine more malware samples including Windows malware as well
as examine other architectures such as Hadoop and containers. We also plan to
analyze and propose new deep learning techniques by infecting multiple VMs to
replicate more sophisticated attack scenarios.
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